(Jim) Webb Of Deceit

I was going to blog on this, I'm glad Instapundit picked it up at Outside the Beltway. But there are two points and a few links I'd add.

It’s an interesting question and one Rice dodges.

Given the quick, solid analysis you can read at the OTB link above, I'm unclear what's so interesting about the question in any sense other than the political. I can still remember Civics 101 from about fifth grade where we learned that the President has the authority to deploy troops, but the Congress is not obligated to sustain the effort beyond 60 plus 30 days. Obviously, some might disagree, but what about Jim Webb?

He noted that a major factor in his and others'  opposition to the war was that it would empower Iran.  ...  He said "it would be a bold move for President Bush to fly to Tehran" and initiate talks.

He then asked his question, saying first that at the Pentagon during Reagan's tenure the President's powers vis a vis authority to launch military actions was well understood....

Putting aside that Webb apparently wants Bush to fly to Tehran and negotiate with the Mullahs for a moment, from the links below, one might conclude a few things about Webb. He was Secretary of the Navy under an administration that, not only got around the War Powers Resolution - the administration exposed it as so vague as to not be of much use at all.

In The Boston Manifesto, a document opposing John Kerry's initial run for Congress - yeah, you read that right, a document that was no friend to the War Powers Resolution, Webb's own words were cited as part of their larger argument for the Vietnam War, pointing out how the media and liberal politicians at homed undermined that very thing and, in doing so, failed to support the troops.

Assuming Webb isn't a fool, then all he was doing with his questioning was playing a silly political game in an attempt to score political points with the Left, which fear-mongered on repeal of the ambiguous resolution during Webb's campaign. And he is doing it while absolutely reversing himself based upon his previous combat, post-combat and executive branch experience - the very things which got him elected. During mostly all of that, he was on the absolute other side of this Constitutional argument.

Links and excerpts below.

...

page 105 THE BOSTON MANIFESTO: A Statement by a Group of Vietnam Veterans Explaining their Outrage Over the Nomination of Senator John F. Kerry to be President of the United States Prepared by the VIETNAM VETERANS TO CORRECT THE MYTHS October 18, 2004

Many Vietnam veterans still have angry feelings towards much of the media over its irresponsible role in undermining public support for the war. As former Navy Secretary and Marine Vietnam veteran, Jim Webb observed in 1998, when a 1980 Harris survey showed 91 percent of Vietnam veterans were “glad they served” and nearly two-out-of-three “would go to Vietnam again even if they knew how the war would end,” the “only national media report on the survey’s results was an Associated Press story head-lined “’One in three would not serve again if asked.’”281

281 Webb, “The Media’s War on Vietnam Vets,” Wall Street Journal, July 15,
1988.

Thus, on tonight's program, we see a distinguished group of people - former President Gerald R. Ford, Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Senator Christopher J. Dodd, former Solicitor General Archibald Cox and Bobby R. Inman, former deputy director of Central Intelligence, among them - debate the War Powers Act. The format is a seminar; the moderator is Benno C. Schmidt Jr., dean of Columbia University Law School.

The debate is earnest, even impassioned. At the same time, the positions put forth on the President's Constitutional war powers parallel the positions the debaters have taken on foreign policy. Senator Dodd, for example, a liberal Democratic critic of Reagan Administration policy in Lebanon and El Salvador, argues against covert activity. Senator Hatch, a Reagan supporter, upholds it. They address themselves to their view of the world as much as to their view of the Constitution.

The 1973 War Powers Act - unfortunately, the program never quite explains it - requires the President to notify Congress within 48 hours after he sends troops into combat. It prohibits him from keeping the troops there for more than 90 days unless Congress either declares war or passes a joint resolution upholding the President's policy.

On the other hand, the Constitution also says the President is Commander in Chief of the armed forces. Presumably, this gives him the authority to deploy troops as he sees fit. As former Associate Justice Potter Stewart notes in a commentary, the War Powers Act muddies the water; it seems to conflict with the President's authority as Commander in Chief.

Implicit in the discussion, meanwhile, is a sense of the durability and vitality of American institutions. Philip W. Buchen, who was counsel to Mr. Ford in the White House, says that under certain circumstances he would have advised Mr. Ford that the War Powers Act was illegal, giving Mr. Ford the authority to defy Congress.

Mr. Ford agrees, but he says he would have abided by Congress's wishes nonetheless. ''This is the way,'' he says, ''our system works.'' It is a reassuring statement.

...

If the War Powers Resolution had failed under Ford because of lack of implementation, then it failed under Reagan because of its lack of clarity.  Reagan was instrumental in exposing the fundamental flaws of the Resolution.  These flaws were disastrous for Congress, as they were forced to rethink the roles that had been established by the Resolution.  Michael Glennon demonstrates the problems that occurred in the early 1980's in his article, "The War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later:  More Politics than Law.".

Glennon begins by pointing out that Section 4(a) requires that the president make a report to Congress no more than 48 hours after committing troops to hostilities.  Furthermore, pursuant to Section 5(b), the commitment must end 60 days after submission of the report under Section 4(a)(1).  This is one of the fundamental flaws of the War Powers Resolution.  The 60-day clock only starts after the “hostilities” report of Section 4(a)(1) has been submitted or was required to have been submitted.  However, Section 4 allows for two other types of reports to be submitted instead.  They are Section 4(a)(2), when forces have been introduced “into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat” (Public Law 93-148, U.S. War Powers Resolution, 68 AJIL 2 372 (1974) at 373) and Section 4(a)(3), when forces are introduced “in numbers which substantially enlarge Unites States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in foreign nation” (Public Law 93-148, U.S. War Powers Resolution, 68 AJIL 2 372 (1974) at 373).

Hence, when Reagan submitted two reports on the escalation of troops in Lebanon, and one on the invasion of Grenada, he did not specify under which subsection the report applied.  Because he had not technically filed a “hostilities” report under Section 4(a)(1), the 60-day clock did not immediately trigger.  This caused what Glennon refers to as role-reversal on the part of the two branches.

Comments

[Purple Avenger]

"Assuming Webb isn't a fool..."

A bold assumption ;->

[Carl]

Yep, 6 more years. You silly macacas just need to deal with it.

[Catzmaw]

Wait a minute, wasn't Webb talking about the 2002 authorization for Bush to proceed on Iraq? Why are you talking about the War Powers Resolution when that wasn't the issue? He read the actual language of the 2002 resolution and asked a specific question of how it would be interpreted by the Bush administration vis a vis a possible unilateral decision to attack Iran. Given all the saber-rattling Bush has been doing lately, most notably in his last speech, it's a legitimate question. Instead of addressing his question in context you substituted something about the War Powers Resolution so you could attack Webb for his purported "reversal". Another straw man set up by the desperate right-wing supporters of this endless and pointless conflict. Since you're so in the know maybe you can answer the question Webb's been posing for years - what's the endpoint to all this? What constitutes victory?

[Dan Riehl]

What constitutes victory?

In the first place, I did not create a straw man, actually Webb may have tried. Bush does not need the resolution on Iraq to initiate an action against Iran. Any restriction he faces is through the War Powers Resolution, which isn't much, as Webb damn well knows. The resolution on Iraq is irrelevant to action in Iran, except to the extent that forces threaten our troops in an immediate manner. He could then authorize action, but would be required to report it to Congress. No one but the Left has said anything about even hot pursuit into Iran.

As for victory, if you'd listen, he has been telling yuou for years - a free and stable Iraq capable of protecting its borders. How much more clear can that be? It amounts to the same "victory goals we established for Germany, much of Europe and SOuth Korea. And I dont hear anyone complaining that after 40 - 50 years, we still park troops there for that, among other purposes.

[Catzmaw]

So the 2002 resolution is a mere redundancy? If so, why was it necessary in the first place? And if it's practically the same as the War Powers Resolution why didn't you address it and not the WPR in your post? Isn't the whole issue about the ambiguous language of the 2002 resolution which could possibly be read to authorize hot pursuit or even preemptive action against Iran? You've missed the whole point.

Re victory being a "free and stable Iraq capable of defending its borders", that may be the kool-aid Bush is serving, but who's drinking it other than the most dedicated Bush supporters? Iraq can't be free and stable. From the looks of things it probably can't even be a complete Iraq instead of three separate entities linked into a loose confederation. Even Iraq's constitution provides for a weak central government and looks suspiciously like our Articles of Confederation except for the part where it purports to establish Iraq as an Islamic state. Maybe you ought to tell the women in southern Iraq areas which have been virtually taken over by mullahs and sharia law about all the new freedoms we've brought them.

Polls in Iraq have been showing for months that the vast majority of Iraqis want us gone, and over 61% support attacks on American troops. How can we stabilize Iraq by staying there? There will never be peace and stability in Iraq until we leave and they wear themselves out with their internecine savagery and then finally recognize the need for peace. That's our "victory".