Why Moqtada al-Sadr Must Go

You'll recognize this below, but it's usually attributed to Iranian President Ahmed Ahmadinejad. I found it buried in a fact filled, ten page Newsweek profile, Sword of the Shia.

Sadr himself was determined to lead a national movement—using a potent mixture of anti-occupation militancy and millennial preaching about the coming of the mysterious 12th imam, who Shiites believe will save mankind. "Moqtada is absolutely hooked on the concept of the reappearance of the Mahdi," says Amatzia Baram, the director of the Ezri Center at Haifa University.

In many ways, dealings with Sadr spell out precisely how we have been failing in Iraq. At first, he was underestimated because we relied on advice from Ahmad Chalabi and Abdul Majid al-Khoei.

The story of the U.S. confrontation with Moqtada al-Sadr is, in many ways, the story of American folly in Iraq. It's a story of ignorance and poor planning, missteps and confusion. Key policymakers often disagreed about the importance of Sadr and about how to deal with him. The result was half-measures and hesitation. But the story isn't just about past failures. It also contains lessons—and warnings—about the future.

Saddam killed Sadr's father and was likely to take out Sadr, too. Instead, we invaded, Sadr killed al-Khoei and the US and new Iraqi government did nothing even when a warrant was issued, mostly because we didn't have enough boots on the ground to handle any potential backlash. Contrast that with Saddam, who did what he had to do to retain control, while crushing any subsequent protests.

The first sighting of black-clad militiamen identifying themselves as part of Mahdi Army seems to have come in September 2003 in the southern town of Kufah. "I do not care what the Americans have to say about this, and I never did," said Sadr when asked about the new militia by reporters later that month. "Only the Iraqi people can choose who they want to protect their country." The U.S. military, fighting an ever-growing insurgency by the minority Sunnis, who had lost power with Saddam's downfall, didn't want to instigate a two-front war. But that left the United States without a strategy.

Sadr's influence continued to grow. After all, he now makes up Maliki's power base. And during that time American influence began to ebb with much of the Shi'ite population, often supplanted by the influence of Sadr.

Diamond went to Bremer and gave him his assessment: the United States urgently needed to act against Sadr. Bremer responded that he was waiting for a new plan from Coalition forces. "I first wanted to go after him when he had probably fewer than 200 followers," Bremer recalled in an interview with NEWSWEEK last week. "I couldn't make it happen ... the Marines were resisting doing anything." But in the meantime, on March 28, 2004, Bremer suspended publication of Sadr's newspaper after it ran an editorial praising the 9/11 attacks on America as a "blessing from God."

The response was swift: mass demonstrations, which led to the first of two Sadr uprisings in 2004. In a final meeting between Diamond and Bremer on April 1, Diamond pressed the point that the United States needed more troops in Iraq. It was around 8 p.m., and Bremer's dinner was sitting on a tray uneaten. He looked exhausted. "And he just didn't want to hear it," says Diamond. "In retrospect, I think he had gone to the well on this issue of more troops during 2003, had gotten nowhere ... and had just resigned himself to the fact that these troops just weren't going to come. I think the tragedy is that everyone just gave up."

The US military did eventually confront the Mahdi army more than once, but each time a ceasefire was enacted before it was destroyed. Eventually our old friend Chalabi helped Sadr into the political process.

But Sadr himself stayed out of government, and kept his distance. That way he could pursue a dual strategy—rebuilding his militia even as he capitalized on his control of key ministries, like Health and Transportation, to provide services to the poor and jobs to his followers.

Sadr is now playing Mr. Inside Outside and doing it rather well. When American resources are used, he co-opts them, leaving people the impression they are his. When people aligned with him are arrested, they are often let go upon protest. With many local chiefs under him, now there's talk of fear with taking him out, as the snake could grow two dozen heads. But given Sadr's ideological bent, that's likely a chance that would have to be taken if anything resembling the original Bush plan for Democracy is going to hold sway.

The key will likely be Bush meeting with Maliki this week. We would need to temporarily increase troop strength, take Sadr out and effectively put down subsequent protests. Some key lieutenants would have to confronted quickly and with extreme force to begin to get things back under control.

For now, Sadr's forces and Sunni terrorists along with Sunni's taking revenge for Shi'ite attacks make up the bulk of the violence. Taking out Sadr's forces would again isolate al-Qaeda forces to be handled by a combination of American and Iraqi forces, as they continue to grow.

With Sadr where he is, any solution that involves walking away will likely turn Iraq over to an ideologue precisely like Ahmadinejad of Iran. It doesn't take much to predict what that would mean for the entire Middle-East.

Comments

[Purple Avenger]

We should have whacked Mookie three years ago. Now it'll be messier and we got a bunch of his goons to do at the same time, but is there any choice? Really?

[old trooper]

The Fat Boy and his band of murdering thugs must be put down like rabid dogs.

[Bob]

The time has come to make him a martyr!